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Introduction	
	Philip	K.	Dick’s	seminal	novel,	Do	Androids	Dream	of	Electric	Sheep?	(adapted	into	the	film	
Blade	Runner),	poses	multiple	questions	about	the	relations	between	humans	and	non-humans.	One	such	question	concerns	whether	we	might	one	day	reach	a	future	in	which	robotic	humanoids	(i.e.	the	titular	‘androids’)	and	humans	are	no	longer	easily	distinguishable.	In	the	age	of	social	media,	it	is	now	evident	that	the	question	Dick	initiated	over	half	a	century	ago	has	found	particular	relevance	in	the	figure	of	the	‘socialbot’.	As	Gehl	
This	is	a	PRE-PRINT	version	of	the	following	book	chapter:	Graham,	T.,	&	Ackland,	R.	(2017).	Do	Socialbots	Dream	of	Popping	the	Filter	Bubble?	The	role	of	socialbots	in	promoting	participatory	democracy	in	social	media.	In	M.	Bakardjieva	&	R.	Gehl,	(Eds.),	Socialbots	and	their	friend:	Digital	media	and	the	automation	of	sociality	(Chapter	10).	New	York:	Routledge.		contends:	“The	last	tweet	you	got	may	have	been	from	a	robot”	(Gehl,	2014,	p.	21).	Yet	‘bots’,	loosely	defined	as	software	applications	involved	in	the	automation	of	tasks	over	the	internet,	have	existed	since	at	least	the	mid-1990s.	For	example,	web	crawlers	(bots	that	assist	in	the	collection	and	indexing	of	web	content)	and	‘spambots’	(bots	that	send	massive	volumes	of	unsolicited	‘spam’	email)	are	so	mundane	as	to	appear	almost	invisible	nowadays.	Similarly,	chatbots	or	‘chatterbots’	(bots	that	engage	in	conversation	in	online	spaces)	have	existed	since	the	early	years	of	the	web	(Mauldin,	1994),	and	have	developed	into	the	research	area	of	‘conversational	agents’	(Gaglio	&	Lo	Re,	2014,	pp.	285-299;	see	also	Chapter	Six).	Scholars	have	also	recently	explored	the	role	of	bots	in	automated	high-frequency	trading	within	global	financial	markets,	drawing	to	attention	the	world-shaking	events	that	can	emerge	as	a	result	of	their	complex	interactions	(Steiner,	2012).				Given	the	broader	context,	one	might	ask	what	is	unique	or	interesting	about	socialbots.	Hwang	et	al	offer	the	following:			 What	distinguishes	these	“social”	bots	from	their	historical	predecessors	is	a	focus	on	creating	substantive	relationships	among	human	users—as	opposed	to	financial	resources—and	shaping	the	aggregate	social	behaviour	and	patterns	of	relationships	between	groups	of	users	online.	(2012,	p.	40,	emphasis	added)		In	recent	years	a	growing	body	of	literature	has	explored	the	proliferation	of	socialbots	in	social	media	sites	such	as	Twitter	and	Facebook.	Indeed,	various	studies	have	now	demonstrated	that	socialbots	are	able	to	infiltrate	social	media,	remain	undetected	and	even	function	‘successfully’	as	social	actors	(Boshmaf	et	al,	2011;	Freitas	et	al,	2014).	Like	the	conversional	agent	‘Max’	in	Muhle’s	study,	their	status	as	human	or	non-human	is	not	always	settled,	although	their	capacity	to	be	‘social’	actors	in	a	‘human-like’	way	is	disputed	(Chapter	Six).	Nevertheless,	there	is	no	doubt	that	socialbots	are	able	to	act	successfully	in	generating	attention	and	attracting	followers.	In	an	experiment	to	infiltrate	Twitter	using	socialbots,	Freitas	et	al	(2014)	found	that	“over	the	duration	of	the	experiment,	the	120	socialbots	created	by	us	received	in	total	4,999	follows	from	1,952	distinct	users,	and	2,128	message-
This	is	a	PRE-PRINT	version	of	the	following	book	chapter:	Graham,	T.,	&	Ackland,	R.	(2017).	Do	Socialbots	Dream	of	Popping	the	Filter	Bubble?	The	role	of	socialbots	in	promoting	participatory	democracy	in	social	media.	In	M.	Bakardjieva	&	R.	Gehl,	(Eds.),	Socialbots	and	their	friend:	Digital	media	and	the	automation	of	sociality	(Chapter	10).	New	York:	Routledge.		based	interactions	from	1,187	distinct	users	…	a	significant	fraction	of	the	socialbots	acquire	relatively	high	popularity	and	influence	scores”	(Freitas	et	al,	2014,	p.	7).	In	a	similar	study,	Hwang	et	al	(2011)	discovered	that	socialbots	were	not	only	able	to	infiltrate	target	sub-networks	on	Twitter,	but	also	“succeed	in	reshaping	the	social	graph	of	the	500	targets,	drawing	responses	and	interactions	from	users	that	were	previously	not	directly	connected”	(Hwang	et	al,	2011,	p.	41).	Indeed,	in	making	sense	of	this	phenomenon,	Gehl	(2014)	argues	that	socialbots	are	becoming	enrolled	in	processes	of	noopower	(a	term	drawing	on	Lazzarato),	broadly	defined	as	“the	action	before	action	that	works	to	shape,	modulate,	and	attenuate	the	attention	and	memory	of	subjects”	(Gehl,	2014,	p.	23).	Emerging	theoretical	perspectives	on	socialbots	suggests	a	subtle	and	complex	role	for	social	robotics	in	the	context	of	social	media.		The	ability	for	socialbots	to	appear	human-like	and	also	shape	social	relations	calls	to	mind	the	rogue	Nexus-6	androids	of	Dick’s	novel,	which,	in	the	eyes	of	the	state,	constituted	a	serious	danger	to	individuals	and	society.	Indeed,	discourse	in	recent	literature	tends	to	construct	socialbots	as	a	kind	of	‘danger’	or	hazard	to	society.	For	example,	we	learn	that	socialbots	are	deployed	to	‘infiltrate’	and	‘exploit’	social	network	sites	(SNS)	in	order	to	extract	or	expose	private	information	about	individuals	and	their	workplaces	(see	for	example:	Elyashar	et	al,	2013;	Paradise	et	al,	2014).	We	are	informed	that	‘botnets’,	coordinated	armies	of	socialbots	mimicking	human	users,	are	able	to	circumvent	existing	security	mechanisms	in	order	to	wreak	systemic	havoc	by	spreading	propaganda	or	misinformation	(Boshmaf	et	al,	2011).	Other	studies,	such	as	Mitter	et	al	(2014a)	have	taken	the	dangers	of	socialbots	into	the	‘meta’	realm,	by	developing	a	categorisation	schema	to	understand	and	counter-act	the	various	categories	of	socialbot	‘attacks’	on	SNS.	There	is	certainly	much	validity	to	such	narratives,	and	the	negative	aspects	of	socialbots	constitute	a	complex,	open	research	problem.	However,	there	is	another	side	to	socialbots	that	has	not	attracted	much	scholarly	inquiry,	as	Hwang	et	al	argue:	“While	much	has	been	made	about	the	dark	side	of	social	robotics,	several	positive	applications	interactions	of	this	technology	are	emerging”	(Hwang	et	al,	2012,	p.	40).		
This	is	a	PRE-PRINT	version	of	the	following	book	chapter:	Graham,	T.,	&	Ackland,	R.	(2017).	Do	Socialbots	Dream	of	Popping	the	Filter	Bubble?	The	role	of	socialbots	in	promoting	participatory	democracy	in	social	media.	In	M.	Bakardjieva	&	R.	Gehl,	(Eds.),	Socialbots	and	their	friend:	Digital	media	and	the	automation	of	sociality	(Chapter	10).	New	York:	Routledge.		It	is	therefore	evident	that	much	research	tends	to	highlight	the	dangers	or	risks	associated	with	socialbots—what	might	be	considered	as	the	‘social	bad’	perspective.	In	this	chapter	we	seek	to	evaluate	the	obverse	of	this	perspective	in	order	to	explore	some	beneficial	capacities	of	socialbots	(in	their	capacity	to	‘exploit’	and	shape	online	social	networks).	In	this	way,	in	this	chapter	we	tackle	an	idea	previously	raised	by	Hwang	et	al:	“Swarms	of	bots	could	be	used	to	heal	broken	connections	between	infighting	social	groups	and	bridge	existing	social	gaps.	Socialbots	could	be	deployed	to	leverage	peer	effects	to	promote	more	civic	engagement	and	participation	in	elections”	(2012,	p.	40).	More	specifically,	we	explore	how	socialbots	on	social	media	could	exploit	network	structure	to	mitigate	the	effect	of	political	filter	bubbles	and	political	segregation,	thus	promoting	the	Habermasian	ideal	of	deliberative	democracy	–	a	public	sphere	(e.g.	Habermas,	1996)	where	individuals	can	discuss	matters	of	mutual	interest	and	hopefully	reach	a	common	understanding	or	solution,	or	at	the	least	can	“hear	the	other	side”	(Mutz,	2006).	For	simplicity,	we	focus	much	of	our	presentation	on	the	microblog	Twitter	but	our	ideas	are	applicable	to	any	social	media	where	people	congregate	to	discuss	and	engage	with	political	issues	(e.g.	web	forums,	fan	pages	and	group	pages	in	Facebook).			The	remainder	of	this	chapter	is	structured	as	follows.	In	the	next	section	we	define	and	problematise	deliberative	democracy	in	the	context	of	the	web,	highlighting	key	theoretical	perspectives	and	empirical	research.	The	third	section	introduces	and	discusses	the	role	of	socialbots	in	promoting	deliberative	democracy	in	social	media	networks.	In	doing	so,	we	set	forth	three	‘principles’	for	socialbots	that	introduce	key	concepts	and	technical	methods	for	socialbots	in	this	role.	In	section	four,	we	develop	these	concepts	and	methods	further	by	introducing	the	notion	of	‘popperbots’	and	‘bridgerbots’,	providing	a	two-fold	‘schematic’	for	programming	socialbots	to	promote	deliberative	democracy	in	social	media.	Finally,	we	conclude	with	a	reflection	on	the	meaning	and	implications	of	social	robotics	within	the	entangled	trajectories	of	politics,	social	media,	and	contemporary	modes	of	power.		
Filter	bubbles	and	deliberative	democracy	on	the	web:	network	topologies,	algorithmic	
sorting,	and	political	homophily		
This	is	a	PRE-PRINT	version	of	the	following	book	chapter:	Graham,	T.,	&	Ackland,	R.	(2017).	Do	Socialbots	Dream	of	Popping	the	Filter	Bubble?	The	role	of	socialbots	in	promoting	participatory	democracy	in	social	media.	In	M.	Bakardjieva	&	R.	Gehl,	(Eds.),	Socialbots	and	their	friend:	Digital	media	and	the	automation	of	sociality	(Chapter	10).	New	York:	Routledge.		 He	experienced	them,	the	others,	incorporated	the	babble	of	their	thoughts,	heard	in	his	own	brain	the	noise	of	their	many	individual	existences.1		On	the	web,	politics	unfolds	through	topologically	variant	networks,	and	actors	both	shape—and	are	shaped	by—the	hybrid	socio-technological	environments	they	co-habit.	In	the	context	of	political	discussion	online,	one	might	be	tempted	to	regard	the	internet	as	an	equal	or	neutral	playing	field,	whereby	people	of	all	backgrounds	converge	to	learn,	debate,	and	participate	in	political	discourse.	This	was	the	basis	of	early	Utopian	predictions	of	the	impact	of	the	web	on	politics	(e.g.	Castells,	1996):	that	the	web	would	foster	a	new	era	of	broad-based	participation	in	the	direction	and	operation	of	the	political	system.	In	contrast,	Putnam	(2000)	and	Sunstein	(2001)	predicted	a	loss	of	a	common	political	discourse	resulting	from	a	fragmenting	of	the	online	population	into	narrowly	focused	groups	of	individuals	who	are	only	exposed	to	information	that	confirms	their	previously	held	opinions	–	later	referred	to	as	'cyberbalkanisation'	(Van	Alstyne	and	Brynjolfsson,	2005).		These	concerns	about	the	potential	impact	of	the	web	on	democracy	have	continued	into	the	present	era	of	social	media.	In	his	book,	‘The	Filter	Bubble’,	Eli	Pariser	argues	that	web	users	are	increasingly	entrapped	within	personal	‘filter	bubbles’	that	reflect	back	to	them	their	already-held	opinions	or	beliefs,	and	expose	them	to	subjects	they	are	already	interested	in	(Pariser,	2011).	The	‘filter	bubble’,	also	referred	to	as	the	‘echo	chamber’,	can	be	understood	as	emerging	from	two	phenomena:	algorithmic	sorting	(whereby	external	forces	or	'opportunity	structures'	influence	the	types	of	political	information	and	people	that	individuals	are	likely	to	encounter)	and	individual	preferences	(whereby	web	technologies	enable	individuals	to	efficiently	select	who	they	want	to	connect	with	and	what	types	of	information	they	want	to	be	exposed	to).		Algorithmic	sorting	occurs	at	both	the	aggregate-	and	individual-level.	Concerns	about	the	political	implications	of	aggregate-level	sorting	first	emerged	in	Web	1.0	research	which	considered	the	fact	that	the	web,	like	many	large-scale	networks,	has	been	found	to	exhibit	a	'power	law'	in	the	distribution	of	in-links	(meaning	a	very	unequal	distribution,	with	a	small	
This	is	a	PRE-PRINT	version	of	the	following	book	chapter:	Graham,	T.,	&	Ackland,	R.	(2017).	Do	Socialbots	Dream	of	Popping	the	Filter	Bubble?	The	role	of	socialbots	in	promoting	participatory	democracy	in	social	media.	In	M.	Bakardjieva	&	R.	Gehl,	(Eds.),	Socialbots	and	their	friend:	Digital	media	and	the	automation	of	sociality	(Chapter	10).	New	York:	Routledge.		number	of	websites	enjoying	many	in-links	and	the	vast	major	of	websites	only	have	few	or	no	in-links).	Hindman	et	al	(2003)	argued	that	power	laws	on	the	web	could	imply	vast	inequalities	in	the	distribution	of	attention	to	different	political	viewpoints,	since	people	usually	find	new	websites	either	by	following	links	(web	surfing)	or	by	using	search	engines	such	as	Google,	and	in	both	cases	a	website	is	more	likely	to	be	discovered	the	greater	the	number	of	in-links	from	other	relevant	sites.	Aggregate-level	algorithmic	sorting	occurs	in	social	media	in	the	form	of	“trending	topics”	in	Twitter,	for	example,	and	forces	of	cumulative	advantage	(the	'rich	get	richer')	can	help	a	topic	to	take	off.	A	concern	is	that	social	media	companies	can	exert	a	degree	of	curatorial	control	over	trending	topics.	An	oft-cited	example	is	the	fact	that,	during	the	Occupy	Wall	Street	movement,	participants	and	supporters	used	Twitter	extensively	for	communication	and	debate	(garnering	massive	media	attention),	yet	the	#OccupyWallStreet	hashtag	failed	to	become	a	“trending	topic”	on	the	Twitter	homepage	(Gillespie,	2012).			Individual-level	algorithmic	sorting	is	undertaken	by	the	social	media	providers	whereby	web	content	is	‘individualised’	based	on	user	demographics	(e.g.	voluntarily	contributed	profile	data	or	trace	artefact	data	such	as	browser	cookies)	and/or	user	activity	(e.g.	what	types	of	web	content	users	statistically	tend	to	be	interested	in).	In	the	case	of	Twitter,	each	user	has	a	“home	timeline”	that	not	only	displays	content	they	have	elected	to	view,	but	also	content	that	is	suggested	or	curated	by	Twitter’s	algorithms.	As	the	official	Twitter	FAQ	states:	“Your	home	timeline	displays	a	stream	of	Tweets	from	accounts	you	have	chosen	to	follow	on	Twitter.	New	users	may	see	suggested	content	powered	by	a	variety	of	signals”.	The	Twitter	FAQ	continues:	“Additionally,	when	we	identify	a	Tweet,	an	account	to	follow,	or	other	content	that's	popular	or	relevant,	we	may	add	it	to	your	timeline.	This	means	you	will	sometimes	see	Tweets	from	accounts	you	don't	follow	…	Our	goal	is	to	make	your	home	timeline	even	more	
relevant	and	interesting”	(Twitter,	2015,	emphasis	added).			Dormehl	(2014)	argues	that	this	‘algorithmic	culture’	has	a	dual	nature.	On	the	one	hand,	it	is	useful	because	it	filters	out	the	endless	babble,	or	unnecessary	‘noise’,	that	would	otherwise	overwhelm	users	and	software	platforms	(e.g.	social	media	sites,	search	engines).	But	on	the	
This	is	a	PRE-PRINT	version	of	the	following	book	chapter:	Graham,	T.,	&	Ackland,	R.	(2017).	Do	Socialbots	Dream	of	Popping	the	Filter	Bubble?	The	role	of	socialbots	in	promoting	participatory	democracy	in	social	media.	In	M.	Bakardjieva	&	R.	Gehl,	(Eds.),	Socialbots	and	their	friend:	Digital	media	and	the	automation	of	sociality	(Chapter	10).	New	York:	Routledge.		other	hand,	it	is	also	problematic	because	users	are	not	presented	with	“ideologically	untampered”	content,	but	rather	the	opposite—content	that	“flatter	our	personal	mythologies	be	reinforcing	what	we	already	‘know’	about	particular	issues”	(Dormehl,	2014,	p.	47).	Recent	studies	suggest	that	social	media	such	as	Facebook	and	Twitter	are	implicated	in	the	advent	of	
political	filter	bubbles.	Whilst	the	extent	and	nature	of	this	phenomenon	is	debated	(Bozdag	et	al,	2014),	the	algorithmic	modulation	of	incoming	and	outgoing	flows	of	socially	generated	data	suggests	far-ranging	consequences	for	individuals	and	collectives.			While	individuals	are	to	some	extent	guided	by	algorithmic	sorting,	the	role	of	individual	preferences	in	the	creation	of	political	filter	bubbles	is	perhaps	even	more	important.	Earlier	research	also	considered	the	impact	for	politics	of	the	‘narrowcasting’	nature	of	the	web,	whereby	users	could	use	newly-invented	RSS	feed	technology	to	efficiently	select	content	from	online	newspapers	or	blogs	that	matched	their	existing	political	outlook.	The	emergence	of	social	media	has	provided	even	more	opportunity	for	politically-motivated	social	selectivity,	as	individuals	can	make	conscious	decisions	as	to	who	to	friend	in	SNSs	such	as	Facebook	and	who	to	follow,	retweet	or	mention	in	Twitter.	Such	behaviour	can	lead	to	online	networks	that	are	highly	divided	along	ideological	or	political	lines,	a	phenomenon	known	as	political	homophily.			It	is	an	empirical	question	as	to	whether	algorithmic	‘filtering’	of	content	in	social	media	(both	at	the	scale	of	population-based	‘trends’	and	the	scale	of	individual	user	‘timelines’)	and	computer-mediated	social	selection	(friending,	following,	mentioning	etc.)	contribute	to	worsening	already	existing	political	divides	across	its	network.	The	‘filter	bubble’	phenomenon	warrants	careful	and	serious	consideration	because	of	its	possible	implication	in	engendering	creating	social	rifts	that	centre	upon	ideological	or	political	lines.	As	Conover	et	al	point	out,	“a	deliberative	democracy	relies	on	a	broadly	informed	public	and	a	healthy	ecosystem	of	competing	ideas”	(Conover	et	al,	2011b,	p.	89).		
Some	Principles	of	Socialbots	for	promoting	deliberative	democracy	
	
This	is	a	PRE-PRINT	version	of	the	following	book	chapter:	Graham,	T.,	&	Ackland,	R.	(2017).	Do	Socialbots	Dream	of	Popping	the	Filter	Bubble?	The	role	of	socialbots	in	promoting	participatory	democracy	in	social	media.	In	M.	Bakardjieva	&	R.	Gehl,	(Eds.),	Socialbots	and	their	friend:	Digital	media	and	the	automation	of	sociality	(Chapter	10).	New	York:	Routledge.		 "We	selected	her	as	your	first	subject.	She	may	be	an	android.	We're	hoping	you	can	tell."2		In	this	section,	we	identify	three	‘principles’	of	socialbots	for	promoting	deliberative	democracy	on	social	media.		Drawing	on	Muhle	(Chapter	Six),	these	principles	in	a	sense	define	the	characteristics	(membership	categories)	and	respective	activities	(category-bound	activities)	of	socialbots	as	‘good	citizens’.	Before	enunciating	our	principles,	it	is	necessary	to	first	briefly	define	deliberative	democracy	and	outline	how	it	may	be	measured	and	quantified	using	network	analysis.		As	noted	above,	our	definition	of	deliberative	democracy	involves	the	Habermasian	concept	of	the	public	sphere	(e.g.	Habermas,	1996),	an	informal	discursive	space	where	where	individuals	and	groups	can	reach	common	understanding	about	issues	of	mutual	interest,	thus	influencing	public	opinion	and	potentially	leading	to	political	action.	Our	definition	of	deliberative	democracy	thus	does	not	cover	more	formal	deliberation	that	occurs	at	different	levels	within	the	political	system	(for	example,	see	Dryzek,	2010	for	a	discussion	on	deliberative	democracy).		A	network	is	a	set	of	nodes	(vertices	or	entities)	and	a	set	of	ties	(edges	or	links)	indicating	connections	or	relations	between	the	nodes.	While	there	are	several	types	of	networks	that	can	be	extracted	from	Twitter	(as	noted	above,	the	discussion	focuses	on	Twitter	for	simplicity,	but	these	ideas	extend	to	other	types	of	social	media),	we	focus	here	on	the	network	comprising	Twitter	users,	where	ties	are	created	from	users	following	each	other,	and	retweeting,	mentioning	and	replying	to	one	another	(we	refer	to	this	as	the	'user	network').		So	how	can	we	measure	the	extent	or	degree	of	deliberative	democracy	using	the	Twitter	user	network?	A	starting	point	is	to	construct	the	network	of	users	participating	in	Twitter	conversations	on	political	issues,	for	example	by	only	collecting	tweets	that	feature	the	#auspol	(Australian	politics)	hashtag.	So	the	user	network	might	consist	of	all	Twitter	users	
This	is	a	PRE-PRINT	version	of	the	following	book	chapter:	Graham,	T.,	&	Ackland,	R.	(2017).	Do	Socialbots	Dream	of	Popping	the	Filter	Bubble?	The	role	of	socialbots	in	promoting	participatory	democracy	in	social	media.	In	M.	Bakardjieva	&	R.	Gehl,	(Eds.),	Socialbots	and	their	friend:	Digital	media	and	the	automation	of	sociality	(Chapter	10).	New	York:	Routledge.		who	authored	at	least	one	tweet	containing	#auspol,	during	a	particular	time	period.	A	first	quantitative	measure	of	deliberative	democracy	is	the	network	modularity	score	(e.g.	Newman,	2006),	which	assesses	the	strength	of	the	division	of	a	network	into	“communities”	(or	clusters,	or	modules).	Modularity	ranges	between	0	and	1,	with	a	score	closer	to	0	indicating	that	more	linking	is	occurring	between	clusters	than	within	clusters	(i.e.	less	balkanisation).	While	it	is	difficult	to	interpret	a	given	modularity	score	as	an	absolute	measure	of	deliberative	democracy,	modularity	may	be	useful	when	one	is	comparing	across	networks	(e.g.	networks	created	for	different	political	hashtags	or	the	same	hashtag,	but	constructed	for	different	periods	of	time).	So	if	we	found	that	modularity	score	for	the	#auspol	user	network	was	decreasing	over	time	then	this	would	indicate	that	the	Twitter	conversation	is	becoming	less	clustered,	thus	indicating	an	increase	in	deliberative	democracy.			However,	underlying	our	use	of	clustering	in	the	Twitter	user	network	as	a	measure	of	deliberative	democracy	is	a	very	strong	assumption	regarding	the	nature	of	interactions	that	are	taking	place	in	political	spaces	on	Twitter.	Specifically,	our	approach	involves	the	use	of	large-scale	unobtrusively	collected	digital	trace	data:	mention,	reply,	retweet	and	follower	ties.	Thus,	we	assume	that	if	a	Twitter	user	creates	a	tie	to	another	user	(via	a	reply,	retweet,	mention	or	follow)	then	this	tie	either	reflects	a	shared	political	outlook	(political	homophily)	or	at	the	very	least,	is	indicative	of	a	desire	to	engage	in	a	considered	exchange	of	ideas.	Deliberative	democracy	therefore	involves	a	qualitative	dimension,	that	would	not	be	accounted	for	in	the	approach	we	describe	above.	Using	SNA	terminology,	our	modularity	clustering	measure	of	deliberative	democracy	assumes	that	ties	in	Twitter	only	reflect	positive	affect.		If	members	of	opposing	political	groups	started	engaging	in	name	calling	or	abusive	behaviour	on	Twitter	(that	is,	creating	negative	affect	ties)	then	this	would	lead	to	a	network	that	is	less	clustered,	but	this	surely	would	not	indicate	increasing	deliberative	democracy.		There	is	a	second	reason	why	we	should	be	careful	in	interpreting	modularity	clustering	in	the	Twitter	user	network	as	a	measure	of	deliberative	democracy.	Even	if	there	were	only	
This	is	a	PRE-PRINT	version	of	the	following	book	chapter:	Graham,	T.,	&	Ackland,	R.	(2017).	Do	Socialbots	Dream	of	Popping	the	Filter	Bubble?	The	role	of	socialbots	in	promoting	participatory	democracy	in	social	media.	In	M.	Bakardjieva	&	R.	Gehl,	(Eds.),	Socialbots	and	their	friend:	Digital	media	and	the	automation	of	sociality	(Chapter	10).	New	York:	Routledge.		positive	affect	ties	in	the	network,	there	could	still	be	a	significant	change	in	network	modularity	between	two	time	periods	without	any	underlying	change	in	deliberative	democracy.	For	example,	if	in	the	#auspol	conversation	on	Twitter	there	was	an	increase	in	reciprocity	(I'll	retweet	you	because	you	retweeted	me)	or	triadic	closure	(I	follow	person	A	and	person	A	follows	person	B,	therefore	I'm	going	to	follow	person	B	too),	then	this	could	result	in	the	#auspol	network	becoming	more	clustered	(modularity	score	increasing)	without	any	underlying	change	in	political	homophily.			Hence	we	recognise	that	modularity	is	a	blunt	measure	of	deliberative	democracy,	but	propose	it	as	an	initial	way	of	operationalising	the	principles	of	socialbots.			Our	principles	of	socialbots	for	promoting	deliberative	democracy	are	presented	in	the	style	of	Asimov’s	famous	‘Three	Laws	of	Robotics’	(see:	Asimov,	1950),	however	their	scope	and	application	is	much	less	epochal	or	universal.	The	principles	relate	specifically	to	the	survival	and	effective	functioning	of	socialbots	on	social	media.	In	the	remainder	of	this	section	we	expound	upon	these	principles	in	more	detail,	before	progressing	to	the	specific	roles	that	we	envisage	for	socialbots	(discussed	in	the	next	section).			
Some	Principles	of	Socialbots:		 1. Socialbots	must	do	no	harm	to	human	beings	(measured	in	political	and	non-political	terms);	2. Socialbots	must	protect	their	own	existence,	except	where	doing	so	would	conflict	with	the	First	Principle;	3. Socialbots	must	make	a	significant	improvement	to	deliberative	democracy,	obtaining	
non-trivial,	quantifiable	effects	in	the	target	sub-network(s),	except	where	doing	so	would	conflict	with	the	First	and	Second	Principles.		
The	First	Principle	of	Socialbots	
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1. Socialbots	must	do	no	harm	to	human	beings	(measured	in	political	and	non-political	
terms);		Isaac	Asimov	ushered	into	the	world	an	enduring	problem	in	robotics—namely,	that	the	notion	of	a	robot	causing	‘harm’	is	very	difficult	to	define	precisely.	In	the	context	of	this	paper,	the	First	Principle	of	Socialbots	seeks	to	operationalise	‘harm’	broadly	in	two	ways:	political	and	non-political.	We	will	briefly	deal	with	both	of	these	problems	in	this	section	and	suggest	several	approaches	to	address	them.	Again,	they	are	very	specific	to	the	research	problem	in	this	chapter,	although	we	feel	there	may	be	broader	applicability	to	socialbots	vis-à-vis	social	media.		First,	for	a	socialbot,	what	would	it	mean	to	cause	political	harm?	Although	this	is	a	complex	and	multifaceted	problem,	at	the	most	abstract	level	we	argue	that	if	a	socialbot	is	positioned	at	a	political	extreme	(e.g.	far-right	or	far-left),	then	it	is	held	to	cause	political	harm	and	therefore	contravene	the	First	Principle.	While	measuring	whether	a	socialbot	is	‘politically	extreme’	is	non-trivial,	we	argue	that	this	problem	is	not	insurmountable,	in	light	of	recent	developments	in	the	literature	and	key	concepts	within	social	network	analysis	(SNA)	and	graph	theory.	We	will	now	briefly	elaborate	upon	two	possible	paths	towards	measuring	whether,	and	how,	socialbots	could	cause	‘political	harm’	in	social	media	networks.			First,	socialbots	could	be	programmed	to	endeavor	to	occupy	a	position	within	the	target	subnetwork(s)	that	approximates	regular	equivalence	with	ideologically	or	politically	‘moderate’	users.	This	argument	centres	on	the	graph	theoretic	notion	of	‘regular	equivalence’	whereby	“two	nodes	in	a	social	network	are	regularly	equivalent	if	they	fulfil	the	same	role”	(van	Steen,	2010,	p.	259).	What	we	are	suggesting	here	is	that	socialbots	could	be	programmed	to	occupy	a	similar	‘social	role’,	or	in	Muhle’s	terms	‘membership	category’	(Chapter	Six),	in	the	network	to	users	who	are	moderate	in	their	ideological	or	political	views.	Roughly	speaking,	socialbots	would	attempt	to	‘blend	in’	by	analysing	the	network	structure	of	moderate	users	and	then	attempt	to	replicate	it,	aiming	to	maximise	an	approximate	
regular	equivalence	with	such	users,	within	the	constraints	of	the	Twitter	API	and	
This	is	a	PRE-PRINT	version	of	the	following	book	chapter:	Graham,	T.,	&	Ackland,	R.	(2017).	Do	Socialbots	Dream	of	Popping	the	Filter	Bubble?	The	role	of	socialbots	in	promoting	participatory	democracy	in	social	media.	In	M.	Bakardjieva	&	R.	Gehl,	(Eds.),	Socialbots	and	their	friend:	Digital	media	and	the	automation	of	sociality	(Chapter	10).	New	York:	Routledge.		computational	resources	of	the	researchers.	In	this	way,	‘politically	moderate’	provides	a	kind	of	membership	category	that	defines	the	identity	of	a	given	user,	which	is	calculated	by	analysing	the	user’s	network	structure.		In	order	to	identify	which	Twitter	users	are	‘moderate’	and	should	therefore	be	targeted,	the	methods	outlined	in	Conover	et	al	(2011a)	or	Boutyline	&	Willer	(2014,	working	paper),	appear	especially	suited	to	the	task.	Conover	et	al	(2011a)	find	that	the	best	way	to	predict	political	affiliation	in	Twitter	networks	is	by	analysing	the	‘community’	structure	of	retweet	networks	(i.e.	where	nodes	represent	users,	and	links	between	nodes	represent	whether,	and	how	many	times,	user	i	has	retweeted	user	j,	and	vice	versa).	In	their	study,	Conover	et	al	(2011)	manually	code	1,000	randomly	selected	users	into	three	political	affiliation	categories:	‘left’,	‘right’,	or	‘ambiguous’.	In	addition	to	other	methods,	they	perform	community	detection	on	the	retweet	network	of	23,766	users,	resulting	in	two	‘clusters’	emerging.	They	classify	users	by	political	affiliation	using	the	cluster	each	user	is	assigned	to,	and	find	that	this	yields	a	95%	accuracy	when	evaluated	against	the	manually	coded	users.	Figure	1	(below)	is	adapted	from	Conover	et	al	(2011a,	p.	197),	which	visualises	the	partisan	division	of	the	retweet	network	into	‘left’	(blue	nodes)	and	‘right’	(red	nodes)	clusters.	We	have	superimposed	a	yellow-coloured	oval	where	the	two	clusters	intersect,	providing	a	visual	indication	of	where	socialbots	could	look	to	target	politically	‘moderate’	users,	who	bridge	together	the	two	divided	clusters.	The	network	structure	of	these	target	users	would	then	provide	a	statistically	calculable	‘social	role’	that	socialbots	can	emulate,	by	attempting	to	establish	and	maintain	regular	equivalence.		
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Figure	1.	The	political	retweet	network,	laid	out	using	a	force	directed	algorithm.	Adapted	from	Predicting	the	Political	Alignment	of	Twitter	Users	(p.	197),	by	Conover	et	al,	2011,	IEEE	Third	International	Conference	on	Social	Computing	(SocialCom).	Copyright	2011	by	PASSAT.	Adapted	with	permission.		Second,	socialbots	could	be	programmed	to	endeavor	to	occupy	a	position	within	the	target	subnetwork(s)	that	is	maximally	neutral	in	respect	to	quantified	measures	of	political	affiliation	and/or	ideological	segregation.	In	other	words,	what	we	are	suggesting	is	that	socialbots	should	not	find	themselves	in	a	situation	where	they	appear	to	have	clearly	‘taken	a	side’	or	become,	in	a	word,	partisan.	Again,	it	is	possible	to	assess	this,	at	least	crudely,	using	the	SNA	methods.	In	order	to	measure	whether	this	has	occurred	would	necessitate	programming	socialbots	to	periodically	assess	the	structure	of	their	social	network	and	their	network	activity.	To	achieve	this,	the	techniques	and	methodology	as	developed	in	Conover	et	al	(2011a),	Halberstam	&	Knight	(2014),	or	Golbeck	(2014)	would	provide	a	suitable	
This	is	a	PRE-PRINT	version	of	the	following	book	chapter:	Graham,	T.,	&	Ackland,	R.	(2017).	Do	Socialbots	Dream	of	Popping	the	Filter	Bubble?	The	role	of	socialbots	in	promoting	participatory	democracy	in	social	media.	In	M.	Bakardjieva	&	R.	Gehl,	(Eds.),	Socialbots	and	their	friend:	Digital	media	and	the	automation	of	sociality	(Chapter	10).	New	York:	Routledge.		reference	point.	For	example,	a	socialbot	may	calculate	that	its	structural	position	within	the	political	retweet	network	expresses	a	‘left’	political	identity,	as	formulated	by	Conover	et	al	(2011a).	In	this	case,	the	socialbot	would	seek	to	remedy	this	bias	by	retweeting	from	users	who	are	calculated	to	have	a	‘right’	political	identity.	Similarly,	following	Conover	et	al,	socialbots	may	seek	to	ensure	that	their	position	in	the	network	results	in	a	classification	as	‘ambiguous’,	for	example,	by	strategically	‘mentioning’	users	from	both	clusters	of	the	political	divide	(2011,	p.	197).	These	ideas	are	expanded	upon	further	in	the	next	section,	where	we	focus	on	two	specific	roles	for	socialbots	for	promoting	deliberative	democracy	in	social	media	networks.		Attention	now	turns	to	the	second	definition	of	‘harm’	as	defined	in	the	First	Principle—namely,	what	would	it	mean	for	a	socialbot	to	cause	non-political	harm?	Here	we	are	concerned	with	a	more	general	understanding	of	‘harm’,	which	evokes	Asimov’s	enduring	problematic	of	how	to	define	and	understand	the	notion	of	robots	causing	harm	in	a	‘social’	context.	Accordingly,	what	we	offer	here	is	a	rudimentary	or	preliminary	path	forward.	We	would	like	to	focus	upon	one	problem	in	particular,	which	has	longstanding	relevance	to	bots	on	the	web—namely,	that	socialbots	should	never	become	‘spambots’.	Thus,	a	socialbot	is	said	to	cause	harm	if,	through	the	frequency	of	its	activity,	it	inconveniences	other	users	or	those	managing	the	service.	In	some	respects,	this	harkens	to	the	‘bad	name’	or	negative	attention	that	socialbots	inherit	from	their	predecessors.	Socialbot	creators	could	take	at	least	one	of	two	approaches	to	ensure	socialbots	do	not	‘spam’	networks	and	thus	contravene	the	First	Principle.	The	first	approach	could	be	to	set	fixed	parameters	based	on	evidence	from	the	literature—for	example,	sending	a	maximum	of	N	tweets	per	hour	within	a	fixed	set	of	times	(e.g.	8am	to	9pm	weekdays;	1pm	to	11pm	weekends).	Another	approach	would	be	to	program	socialbots	to	define	their	own	parameters	for	‘non-spammy’	update	frequencies	by	calculating	it	based	on	other	users	in	the	network.	For	example,	a	socialbot	could	(periodically)	query	a	random	sample	of	1000	users,	calculate	the	average	tweets	per	hour	as	a	function	of	the	total	
number	of	status	updates	and	the	timestamp	of	when	the	user	was	created,	and	then	take	the	median	value	of	this	set	of	averages	as	a	socially	‘appropriate’	hourly	rate	for	sending	out	status	updates.	However,	we	again	wish	to	point	out	that	this	is	only	one	aspect	of	socialbots	
This	is	a	PRE-PRINT	version	of	the	following	book	chapter:	Graham,	T.,	&	Ackland,	R.	(2017).	Do	Socialbots	Dream	of	Popping	the	Filter	Bubble?	The	role	of	socialbots	in	promoting	participatory	democracy	in	social	media.	In	M.	Bakardjieva	&	R.	Gehl,	(Eds.),	Socialbots	and	their	friend:	Digital	media	and	the	automation	of	sociality	(Chapter	10).	New	York:	Routledge.		causing	‘harm’,	for	which	space	precludes	detailed	discussion	in	this	paper.	For	example,	determining	whether	the	textual	content	of	a	given	status	update	is	‘harmful’	(e.g.	using	offensive	terms	or	spreading	‘hate	speech’).	Techniques	to	deal	with	such	problems	may	centre	upon	using	dictionaries	of	terms	(for	offensive	words)	or	using	machine	learning	to	build	models	to	predict	whether	a	tweet	has	a	high	degree	of	hate	speech	(and	therefore	not	‘retweet’	it,	for	example).	Future	research	may	seek	to	further	explore	such	lines	of	inquiry.		
The	Second	Principle	of	Socialbots	
	 2. Socialbots	must	protect	their	own	existence,	except	where	doing	so	would	conflict	with	the	First	Principle;		Perhaps	the	most	fundamental	facet	of	the	Second	Principle	is	that	socialbots	must	not	be	
detected	as	non-human	(providing	this	does	not	conflict	with	the	First	Principle).	However,	we	are	not	arguing	that	the	Second	Principle	necessitates	creating	socialbots	that	could,	for	example,	pass	the	Turing	Test	or	instigate	the	kinds	of	existential	problems	presented	by	the	
Nexus-6	androids	in	Philip	K.	Dick’s	novel.	Far	from	such	lofty	aspirations,	the	Second	Principle	simply	specifies	that	socialbots	should	present	and	conduct	themselves	in	a	manner	that,	at	a	minimum,	ensures	they	survive	long	enough	for	the	Third	Principle	to	come	into	operation	(and	not	contravene	the	First	Principle).	This	is	perhaps	somewhat	self-evident.	Yet	the	scope	and	nature	of	this	task	is	less	straightforward	than	it	might	first	appear,	as	the	literature	previously	cited	in	this	chapter	suggests.	Socialbots	must	not	only	contend	with	Twitter’s	security	mechanisms	(that	deploy	sophisticated	algorithms	to	find	and	remove	fake	user	accounts	and	spambots),	but	also	avoid	‘citizen	policing’—users,	organisations,	or	perhaps	even	other	bots,	that	detect	and	report	social	robots	to	Twitter.	And	as	the	Third	Principle	serves	to	address,	merely	‘surviving’	is	only	the	first	step	for	socialbots—the	next	problem	concerns	the	ability	to	‘thrive’.	It	could	be	argued	that	socialbots	programmed	using	these	Principles	would	simply	do	nothing,	thereby	satisfying	the	First	and	Second	Principles.	For	example,	a	socialbot	that	does	not	send	out	any	status	updates	(e.g.	tweets)	is	arguably	following	an	optimal	strategy	to	avoid	detection	and	do	no	harm.	However,	the	Third	Principle	
This	is	a	PRE-PRINT	version	of	the	following	book	chapter:	Graham,	T.,	&	Ackland,	R.	(2017).	Do	Socialbots	Dream	of	Popping	the	Filter	Bubble?	The	role	of	socialbots	in	promoting	participatory	democracy	in	social	media.	In	M.	Bakardjieva	&	R.	Gehl,	(Eds.),	Socialbots	and	their	friend:	Digital	media	and	the	automation	of	sociality	(Chapter	10).	New	York:	Routledge.		(below)	ensures	that	this	situation	cannot	occur,	or,	in	the	case	that	it	does,	there	is	logical	reason	for	such	inaction.		Furthermore,	to	achieve	the	Second	Principle	(and	arguably	the	Third	Principle),	socialbots	must	present	and	conduct	themselves	in	a	manner	that	makes	them	appear	sufficiently	‘human’	to,	for	example,	attract	new	followers	and	retweets	(again,	without	contravening	the	First	Principle).	Although	previous	studies	have	achieved	success	with	the	‘detection	avoidance’	problem,	the	problem	of	how	to	exploit	social	networks	for	optimal	effect	proves	trickier.	For	example,	some	studies	suggest	that	female	socialbots	with	‘attractive’	or	‘good-looking’	profile	photos	are	more	successful	for	social	engineering	on	SNS	(Boshmaf	et	al.,	2011).	Others	find	that	the	‘gender’	of	socialbots	has	no	correlation	with	success	or	popularity	(Freitas	et	al.,	2014).	Still	others,	such	as	Wald	et	al	(2013),	take	a	different	tack	by	looking	at	which	types	of	human	users	socialbots	should	target	for	interaction.	Wald	et	al	found	that	the	highest	predictors	of	whether	a	user	is	likely	to	interact	with	socialbots	comes	down	to	how	popular	or	influential	a	user	is	(i.e.	their	‘Klout’	score	and	number	of	friends),	and	the	amount	of	sexual	language	and	terminology	they	tend	to	use	(Wald	et	al,	2013,	p.	10).	The	implication	is	that	users	who	are	more	likely	to	interact	with	socialbots	(e.g.	retweeting	or	‘liking’	their	tweets)	are	those	that	are	well-connected	or	have	more	followers,	and	those	that	use	a	greater	amount	of	sexual	language	and	terminology.	Clearly,	in	terms	of	SNA	methods,	ensuring	that	socialbots	function	effectively	in	social	media	networks	involves	both	‘art’	and	‘science’.	At	the	same	time,	it	reinforces	the	importance	of	the	First	and	Second	Principles	as	one	way	to	approach	socialbot	ethics.		
The	Third	Principle	of	Socialbots	
	 3. Socialbots	must	make	a	significant	improvement	to	deliberative	democracy,	obtaining	
non-trivial,	quantifiable	effects	in	the	target	sub-network(s),	except	where	doing	so	would	conflict	with	the	First	and	Second	Principles.		
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something	(providing	it	does	not	contravene	the	First	and	Second	Principles).	In	this	way,	socialbot	activity	must	be	quantifiable	(accounted	for	statistically)	and	must	also	be	non-
trivial	(having	a	magnitude	of	effect	that	is	not	negligible).	It	is	therefore	evident	that	analysis	of	the	impact	or	effects	of	socialbots	must	pay	attention	to	network	structure	and	network	dynamics	over	time.	Any	studies	that	investigate	whether	socialbots	could,	for	example,	heal	social	rifts,	promote	deliberative	democracy,	bridge	segregated	subnetworks,	or	‘pop’	filter	bubbles,	must	be	able	to	formalise	socialbot	activity	as	a	concrete,	statistically	calculable	
phenomenon.	A	growing	body	of	literature	demonstrates	that	the	methods	and	formalisms	of	SNA	provide	such	tools.	More	specifically,	SNA	methods	to	quantify	and	analyse	political	segregation	and	ideological	clustering	on	Twitter	have	emerged	in	recent	years	(see:	Conover	et	al,	2011a;	Halberstam	&	Knight,	2014;	Golbeck,	2014).	In	particular,	Mitter	et	al	(2014b)	provide	a	detailed	methodology	for	assessing	the	impact	of	socialbots	‘attacks’	on	Twitter	in	terms	of	shaping	or	influencing	the	social	graph	of	a	subset	of	users.	Any	combination	of	these	methods	would	be	suited	to	advancing	the	Third	Principle	of	socialbots,	and	such	methods	are	expanded	upon	later	in	this	section.	Furthermore,	to	achieve	the	Third	Principle,	socialbots	must	present	and	conduct	themselves	in	a	manner	that	makes	them	appear	sufficiently	‘human’	to,	for	example,	attract	new	followers	and	retweets.	This	is	consistent	with	the	Second	Principle,	and	again,	must	not	be	in	contravention	of	the	First	Principle.			We	can	further	operationalise	the	Third	Principle	by	making	the	following	argument:	the	presence	of	socialbots	in	target	sub-networks	should,	over	time,	correlate	with	a	decreased	
modularity	score	(thus	implying	decreased	political	homophily	in	the	target	sub-network,	although	noting	our	caveat	about	equating	changes	in	modularity	with	changes	in	homophily).	This	brings	us	deeper	into	the	realm	of	socialbot	ethics	and	further	reveals	the	raison	d'être	of	socialbots	in	promoting	deliberative	democracy.	In	this	way,	we	can	begin	to	explicate	the	‘life	goals’	or	telos	of	socialbots	in	the	context	of	this	paper—broadly	speaking,	to	build	bridges	between	separate,	ideologically	homogeneous	subnetworks;	to	expose	tightly	knit	clusters	of	users	to	alternative	viewpoints;	or	to	bring	about	measurable	shifts	towards	deliberative	democracy	in	online	discourse.	In	this	way,	the	Third	Principle	draws	stark	attention	to	the	
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normative	political	rationalities	that	socialbots	in	this	role	embody—which	could	be	conceived	as	a	kind	of	social	robotic	‘hacktivism’.	As	Howard	(2003)	writes,	hacktivism	is	understood	broadly	as	using	the	tools	and	strategies	of	hackers	for	political	ends:	“hacktivists	believe	that	they	have	a	responsibility	to	expose	abuses	of	power	and	to	redistribute	informational	
resources”	(Howard,	2003,	p.	216,	emphasis	added).	Positioning	socialbots	as	ersatz	‘hacktivists’	facilitates	a	rethinking	of	their	agential	capacities—in	this	case,	to	propagate	deliberative	democracy	on	social	media	via	the	strategic	exploitation	of	network	structure.	
	
Popperbots	and	bridgerbots:	a	schematic	for	programming	hacktivist	socialbots	on	
Twitter	
	 In	.45	of	a	second	an	android	equipped	with	such	a	brain	structure	could	assume	any	one	of	fourteen	basic	reaction-postures.3		Programming	bots	to	perform	social	roles	in	social	media	environments	represents	a	moving	target.	Over	time,	the	tasks	to	be	performed	by	socialbots	become	suboptimal	or	even	impossible	in	environments	whereby	the	entities	involved—users,	protocols,	algorithms,	data,	hardware	specifications,	and	so	forth—are	constantly	in	flux.	However,	the	aim	in	this	section	is	not	to	provide	a	comprehensive	or	codified	tutorial	for	programming	socialbots,	but	rather	to	set	forth	a	general	‘schematic’	for	how	socialbots	might	be	programmed	to	promote	or	‘propagate’	deliberative	democracy	on	Twitter.	We	wish	to	focus	on	issues	of	methodology	and	the	conceptual,	network-oriented	space	in	which	such	methods	would	be	applied,	which	are	broadly	located	at	the	intersection	of	politics,	the	dynamics	of	social	media	networks,	and	social	robotics.	We	want	to	examine	some	possibilities	and	sketch	out	possible	approaches	moving	forward.	The	over-arching	question	asks	whether	it	is	possible	to	program	socialbots	to	mitigate	or	break	down	political	filter	bubbles	and	ideological	segregation	on	Twitter,	hence	promoting	deliberative	democracy	in	online	discourse.	In	this	section	we	provide	a	possible	answer	to	this	question	by	elucidating	two	distinct	roles	and	respective	category-bound	activities	for	socialbots.		
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1.	‘Popperbots’			We	conceive	the	‘popperbot’	as	a	type	of	socialbot	tasked	with	the	role	of	‘infiltrating’	subnetworks	of	Twitter	users	that	exhibit	high	or	extreme	levels	of	homophily.	Once	the	popperbot	has	established	itself	in	the	subnetwork,	it	would	then	begin	to	‘inject’	information	reflecting	more	moderate	or	even	contrasting	ideological	standpoints.	As	the	name	suggests,	the	idea	is	that	this	type	of	socialbot	will	reduce,	or	in	a	sense	‘pop’	the	ideological	bubble	that	users	within	a	given	subnetwork	are	situated	within,	by	exposing	these	users	to	alternate	points	of	view	that	appear	to	come	from	a	member	of	their	own	cohort.	The	telos	of	the	popperbot	is	to	produce	measurable	increases	in	heterophily	in	the	subnetworks	in	which	they	have	infiltrated.	Similarly,	as	argued	previously	in	relation	to	the	Third	Principle,	popperbots	could	attempt	to	decrease	‘balkanisation’	by	striving	to	reduce	the	modularity	score	of	their	target	subnetwork.	For	example,	a	popperbot	could	be	programmed	to	occasionally	(say,	with	probability	P)	retweet	or	reply	to	users	from	a	different	subnetwork(s)	that	represent	alternate	positions	on	some	issue.	Figure	2	(below)	shows	a	popperbot	infiltrating	a	homophilous	subnetwork	of	Twitter	users	who	are	calculated	to	be	‘right’	(i.e.	conservative)	in	their	political	orientation,	which,	as	mentioned	in	the	previous	section,	could	be	derived	using	the	methods	outlined	in	Conover	et	al	(2011a).			
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Figure	2:	a	‘popperbot’	infiltrating	a	homophilous	subnetwork	(of	politically	conservative	Twitter	users)		If	it	is	not	yet	apparent,	a	fundamental	problem	for	the	development	of	popperbots	is	that	these	socialbots	must,	by	definition,	violate	the	First	Principle	in	order	to	do	their	job.	In	this	way,	a	popperbot	would	have	to	act	in	an	‘extreme’	manner	(as	discussed	previously)	in	order	to	infiltrate	a	homophilous	subnetwork,	even	if	its	ultimate	goal	was	to	‘pop’	the	political	
bubble	in	that	subnetwork.	For	example,	a	popperbot	could	(1)	detect	an	extremely	homophilous	subnetwork	of	individuals	and	then	(2)	attempt	to	infiltrate	the	network	by	adapting	its	profile	and	‘social’	activity	to	correspond	with	the	target	subnetwork.	This	popperbot	could	be	(3)	programmed	to	‘defect’	after	some	time	duration	T	or	acquiring	a	pre-defined	number	of	followers	or	friends	N.	Defection,	of	course,	would	occur	in	the	form	of	injecting	more	moderate	or	perhaps	even	contrasting	information	into	the	subnetwork,	as	discussed	previously.	However,	a	popperbot	would	never	infiltrate	a	network	by	pretending	to	be,	for	example,	a	radical	Communist	because	doing	so	would	definitely	(and	as	we	have	previously	argued,	quantifiably)	violate	the	First	Principle.	Thus,	Asimov’s	enduring	problem	remains	and	we	inherit	another	complex,	or	perhaps	‘wicked’,	problem	to	address.	Yet,	despite	these	obstacles,	we	argue	that	there	are	possibilities	for	moving	forward,	which	could	
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2.	‘Bridgerbots’			‘Bridgerbots’	are	conceptualised	as	socialbots	tasked	with	the	role	of	re-routing	or	‘bridging’	informational	flows	between	otherwise	ideologically	segregated	sub-networks.	They	could	perform	actions	such	as	tweeting/retweeting	and	following	users	from	both	‘sides’	of	a	given	political	or	ideological	debate.	Bridgerbots	would	seek	to	expose	users	from	one	homophilous	subnetwork	to	politically	diverse	types	and	flows	of	information	from	one	or	more	other	homophilous	subnetworks.	In	this	way,	the	network	role	of	bridgerbots	might	be	thought	about	in	a	variety	of	ways.	One	possibility	is	in	terms	of	what	Mark	Granovetter	described	as	
weak	ties.	Weak	ties	are	understood	as	connections	between	different	tightly	knit	groups	that	are	vital	to	information	dissemination	and	therefore	social	opportunities.	As	Granovetter	wrote,	“It	is	remarkable	that	people	receive	crucial	information	from	individuals	whose	very	existence	they	have	forgotten”	(Granovetter,	1973,	p.	1372).			Bridgerbots	could	be	programmed	to	endeavor	to	occupy	a	position	within	the	target	subnetwork(s)	that	maximizes	their	own	betweenness	centrality	score.	Betweenness	centrality,	or	simply	‘betweenness’,	is	a	key	concept	in	SNA	and	graph	theory	more	broadly.	In	a	formal	sense,	the	“betweenness	sigma(M)	of	a	vertex	m	is	the	total	number	of	shortest	paths	between	all	possible	pairs	of	vertices	that	pass	through	this	vertex”	(Dorogovtsev	&	Mendes,	2003,	p.	18,	emphasis	original)1.	We	can	think	about	betweenness	in	terms	of	how	important	a	node	(a.k.a.	vertex)	is	in	providing	a	path	that	connects	isolated	nodes	or	isolated	clusters	of	nodes.	Thus,	informally,	nodes	with	high	betweenness	could	be	loosely	conceived	as	‘brokers’																																																									1	 	In	graph	theory,	a	‘path’	is	an	unbroken	sequence	of	connections	between	two	or	more	vertices.	
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Figure	3:	a	‘bridgerbot’	connecting	two	‘segregated’	subnetworks	(of	politically	conservative	Twitter	users)		Combining	several	arguments	presented	thus	far,	the	role	and	effects	of	bridgerbots	in	respect	to	the	target	sub-network(s)	could	be	tied	to	their	success	in	increasing	their	own	betweenness	score	or	decreasing	the	modularity	score	of	the	subnetwork	that	they	target.	That	is	to	say,	bridgerbots	with	high	betweenness	scores	are	‘bridging’	political	rifts	more	effectively	than	those	with	a	low	score,	and	bridgerbots	who	successfully	decrease	the	
modularity	score	of	a	target	subnetwork(s)	are	successfully	‘bridging’	political	divides.	For	example,	we	could	imagine	that	a	Twitter	user	receives	a	notification	that	a	new	user	has	‘followed’	them—and	they	might	even	return	the	gesture	by	‘following	back’.	Unbeknownst	to	
This	is	a	PRE-PRINT	version	of	the	following	book	chapter:	Graham,	T.,	&	Ackland,	R.	(2017).	Do	Socialbots	Dream	of	Popping	the	Filter	Bubble?	The	role	of	socialbots	in	promoting	participatory	democracy	in	social	media.	In	M.	Bakardjieva	&	R.	Gehl,	(Eds.),	Socialbots	and	their	friend:	Digital	media	and	the	automation	of	sociality	(Chapter	10).	New	York:	Routledge.		the	user,	they	are	now	following	a	bridgerbot	who	has	‘targeted’	them	because	their	social	network	is	extremely	homophilous.	Later,	having	possibly	completely	forgotten	about	this	new	social	connection	(to	the	bridgerbot),	the	user	might	notice	a	tweet	in	their	news	feed	that	reflects	a	more	moderate,	or	perhaps	even	competing,	position	to	their	already	held	beliefs	on	some	issue.	In	this	way,	the	bridgerbot	has	acted	as	a	weak	link,	bridging	heterogeneous	flows	of	information	(e.g.	two	or	more	different	sides	of	a	debate)	to	the	actors	involved	in	such	communication	networks.	Over	time,	if	the	bridgerbot’s	betweenness	score	increases,	or	the	network	structure	becomes	less	modular,	then	the	bridgerbot	can	be	regarded	as	doing	a	‘good	job’.	
	
	
Conclusion		 “Your	position,	Mr.	Deckard,	is	extremely	bad	morally.	Ours	isn't."4		In	this	chapter	we	have	introduced	and	examined	a	role	for	socialbots	that	positions	them	not	as	dangers	or	annoyances,	but	rather	as	socially	beneficent	actors,	capable	perhaps	of	‘building	a	better	world’.	We	did	not	seek	to	examine	whether	socialbots	in	this	context	are	valid	social	actors	with	human-like	agency	(see	Chapter	Six),	but	rather	to	investigate	their	role	in	constructing	and	(re)assembling	the	social	(Latour,	2005).	In	this	way,	we	focussed	upon	a	
normative	role	for	socialbots	in	creating	and	propagating	deliberative	democracy	on	Twitter.	This,	in	one	sense,	can	be	thought	about	as	socialbots	‘popping	the	political	filter	bubble’—e.g.	building	bridges	between	separate,	ideologically	homogeneous	subnetworks,	exposing	tightly	knit	clusters	of	users	to	alternative	viewpoints,	or	bringing	about	measurable	shifts	towards	deliberative	democracy	in	online	discourse.	Yet,	if	socialbots	‘dream’	of	popping	filter	bubbles,	perhaps	we	can	perceive	within	their	dreams	the	spectre	of	our	own	political	rationalities	and	ethical	assumptions.	As	Paul	Henman	writes,	“new	and	emerging	technologies	will	continue	to	initiate	old	questions	in	new	circumstances	of	what	these	technologies	mean”	(Henman,	2013,	p.	300).	It	is	clear	that	socialbots	of	the	kind	we	conceive	in	this	chapter	might	also	dream	in	
other	ways,	ways	that	might	otherwise	seem	unethical	or	politically	abhorrent.		
This	is	a	PRE-PRINT	version	of	the	following	book	chapter:	Graham,	T.,	&	Ackland,	R.	(2017).	Do	Socialbots	Dream	of	Popping	the	Filter	Bubble?	The	role	of	socialbots	in	promoting	participatory	democracy	in	social	media.	In	M.	Bakardjieva	&	R.	Gehl,	(Eds.),	Socialbots	and	their	friend:	Digital	media	and	the	automation	of	sociality	(Chapter	10).	New	York:	Routledge.			In	developing	this	chapter,	we	consciously	adopted	a	normative	position	for	socialbots	in	relation	to	a	particular	social	issue	(deliberative	democracy).	In	doing	so,	this	provided	a	space	in	which	to	demonstrate	and	examine	how	socialbots	might	be	used	to	‘exploit’	network	structure	in	order	to	achieve	‘social	good’.	Yet	what	is	defined	as	ethical,	politically	rational,	socially	beneficent,	etc.,	arguably	depends	upon	one’s	point	of	view.	Hence,	we	can	see	how	socialbots	could	be	deployed	to	achieve	different	or	even	opposite	outcomes	for	deliberative	democracy,	by	simply	adapting	or	perhaps	‘inverting’	various	aspects	of	the	ideas	and	methods	established	in	this	chapter.	As	Hwang	et	al	would	have	it:	“The	same	bots	that	can	be	used	to	surgically	bring	together	communities	of	users	can	also	be	used	to	shatter	those	social	ties.	The	same	socialbot	algorithms	that	might	improve	the	quality	and	fidelity	of	information	circulated	in	social	networks	can	be	used	to	spread	misinformation”	(Hwang	et	al,	2012,	p.	40).			A	particularly	noteworthy	focus	is	governments	seeking	to	monitor	and	sway	political	discourse	online.	For	example,	the	50	Cent	Party	are	“Party-paid	internet	commentators	and	opinion	guiders”	(Sullivan,	2012)	hired	by	the	Chinese	government	and	other	parties	to	attempt	to	steer	online	opinion	and	conversation	towards	particular	directions.	Yet	one	can	easily	imagine	the	50	Cent	Party	deploying	socialbots	alongside,	or	even	in	lieu	of,	human	commentators	and	opinion	guiders.	Indeed,	as	Gehl	writes,	government	agencies	such	as	the	U.S.	Air	Force	have	already	begun	to	contract	out	software	development	companies	to	“gather	intelligence,	build	consensus,	and	influence	opinions	twenty-four	hours	a	day	via	a	network	of	socialbots”	(Gehl,	2014,	p.	39).	In	this	way,	current	concerns	regarding	the	uses	and	abuses	of	socialbots	within	a	political	context	are	not	unfounded.	However,	it	is	also	clear	that	we	are	only	in	the	very	early	stages	of	this	phenomenon.	Hence,	what	we	are	now	witnessing	is	an	increasing	sophistication	of	socialbot	technologies	and	a	diversification	of	their	roles	and	relations	of	power	in	hybrid	techno-social	environments	(see	Gehl,	2014).	Gilles	Deleuze	once	wrote:	“What	counts	is	that	we	are	at	the	beginning	of	something”	(Deleuze,	1992,	p.	7).	The	question	is	how	it	will	unfold.		
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